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NOTES
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND THE
REMEDY OF SELF-HELP: AN UNWARRANTED ADDITION
Promotion of industrial harmony and elimination of racial discrimina-
tion in employment stand as twin national policy goals in the field of
labor relations. The achievement of both requires a carefully scrutinized
balancing process whereby each may be furthered at minimal cost in
terms of detrimental effects upon the other. Beyond efforts within
the traditional labor process and through legislative initiatives toward
attainment of these objectives, the courts have demonstrated a willing-
ness to take full advantage of means available to them to eliminate
lingering vestiges of racial discrimination. Whenever called upon to
develop new avenues of redress, however, it is essential that the courts
take cognizance of the various remedies currendy available to an ag-
grieved party and analyze the necessity for yet another. A critical assess-
ment of the desirability of an additional remedy for racially discrimina-
tory employment practices is particularly important in order to assure
that anticipated advantages of the proposed remedy will not be out-
weighed by detrimental effects it may pose for the associated goal of
maximizing industrial peace.
The traditional labor process has been molded to achieve harmony
in the labor arena while providing avenues for redress of grievances by
individual employees. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) guarantees employees the right "to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing . . ." Section 9 of the Act provides that a bar-
gaining representative, once selected by a majority of bargaining unit
employees, is the exclusive representative of all employees in that unit.'
1. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
2. Section 9(a) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
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Although the relationship between these sections has evoked considerable
discussion,3 the exclusivity principle of section 9 is generally held to
limit the exercise of section 7 rights by individual employees. 4
A recent case suggests, nevertheless, that it may be necessary for the
principle of exclusivity to bow to employee "self-help" remedies when
racial discrimination by an employer is alleged. Evaluation of the wis-
dom of this approach entails examination of its relationship to remedies
existing within the traditional labor process, as well as potential dangers
to that process posed by its implementation. The need for yet another
remedy to combat racial discrimination in the private sector may be
assessed only after an appraisal of the contributions of such existing
devices within the labor relations framework as the "fair representa-
tion" standard of union responsibility, grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures, and section 301 (a) contract actions.
The availability of relief under civil rights legislation must also be
considered as counterbalancing the need for a new remedy potentially
destructive of whatever equilibrium may currently exist in labor-man-
agement relations. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964 provide
a wide spectrum of remedies for the victims of racial discrimination in
private employment. The administrative remedies under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19645 furnish an informal means by which to al-
leviate incidents of racially disparate treatment by employers. As a
powerful supplement to administrative efforts at conciliation, Title
VII permits resort to the federal courts to obtain a full program of ju-
dicial relief. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,6 recently resur-
for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment... "' Id. S 159(a) (emphasis supplied).
3. E.g., Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary
Power, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 681 (1970); Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Ac-
tivities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat"
Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CoRNEL L.Q. 672 (1967); Rosen,
The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem,
24 MD. L. REv. 233 (1964); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 362 (1962).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. S§ 2000e-200Ce-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
6. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Star. 27. The portion of section 1 of the Act
which concerns a person's right to make contracts was reenacted in the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Star. 144, and is codified as 42 US.C. 5 1981 (1970).
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rected from a grave of restrictive court interpretations, provides a com-
prehensive complement to Title VII.
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the remedy of employee
"self-help" recently enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Western Addition Community Organization v.
NLRB7 in light of the procedures currently available to combat racial
discrimination in private employment. To facilitate this analysis, the
discussion is divided into three major areas: first, an examination of the
Western Addition proposal; second, a survey of current and proposed
remedies within the traditional labor-management relations framework;
and, finally, an appraisal of relief available through civil rights legislation.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN "SELF-HELP" AND THE EXCLUSmTY
PRINCIPLE: WESTERN ADDrriON
Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees "the right ... to engage
in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." 8 This section clearly illustrates a con-
gressional attempt to protect from interference employee efforts to en-
force personal or contract rights or to enhance their bargaining position.
Sections 8(a)(1)9 and 8(b)(1)(A)'0  safeguard employee rights to
organize and bargain by providing that employer or union interference
with the exercise of those rights constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Employees not represented by a union are entitled to the full pro-
tection of section 7. In First National Bank v. NLRB," for example,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enforced an unfair labor
practice order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) against
an employer for discharging five employees who, protesting a require-
ment that they work overtime, had staged a walkout. The court, recog-
7. 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nor. Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Organization, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974)
(Nos. 73-696 & 73-830), noted in 87 H~av. L. REv. 656 (1974).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See generally Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections
8(a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails,
52 CoRNEm L.Q. 491 (1967).
9. Section 8(a) (1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
.. to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970).
10. Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this tide...." Id. § 158(b) (l) (A).
11. 413 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1969). See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum C., 370
U.S. 9 (1962). But see Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963).
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nizing that the employees were neither formally organized nor covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, stated that the walkout was a con-
certed activity which retained its section 7 protection even though the
number of employees involved was less than a majority in the bargaining
unit. When employees are represented by a labor organization and
action is taken without majority approval, however, different principles
are applicable.12
Once a labor organization has been selected as bargaining representa-
tive by a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, section 9 of the
NLRA recognizes that organization as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.13
Although it is well established that designation of a union as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative 14 limits employee rights to act inde-
pendently, the courts have differed concerning the extent to which
such employee rights of "self-help" are thereby restricted. 1
Supporting the proposition that "self-help" may be totally precluded
is NLRB v. Draper Corp.,6 in which the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit accorded section 9 the status of an absolute. In Draper
one-fourth of the bargaining unit employees were engaged in a work
stoppage to protest alleged stalling tactics by the employer during nego-
tiations for a new contract. The court held the protest unprotected,
even without a showing that the union opposed the walkout, and not-
withstanding that the contract did not outlaw strikes. In reversing
the Board's decision, the court stated:
Even though the majority of the employees in an industry may
have selected their bargaining agent and the agent may have been
12. See Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1067; Gould, supra
note 3; Shearer, Legal Remedies and Practical Considerations in Dealing with a Wildcat
Strike, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 46 (1972); Summers, supra note 3. See generally Summers,
Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison
of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
14. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
15. For a detailed discussion of the various NLRB-created exceptions to the require-
ment that employees proceed through their representative, see Note, The Majority
Participation Factor in Wildcat Strikes, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1973).
16. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). Accord, NLRB v. Universal Servs., Inc., 467 F.2d
579 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963);
Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953).
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recognized by the employer, there can be no effective bargaining
if small groups of employees are at liberty to ignore the bargaining
agency thus set up, take particular matters into their own hands
and deal independently with the employer....
The employees must act through the voice of the majority or
the bargaining agent chosen by the majority. Minority groups
must acquiesce in the action of the majority and the bargaining agent
they have chosen; and, just as the minority has no right to enter
into separate bargaining arrangements with the employer, so it
has no right to take independent action to interfere with the course
of bargaining which is being carried on by the duly authorized
bargaining agent chosen by the majority.' 7
A countervailing view, that independent activities by employees may
be protected when in support of the union or its position, is illustrated
by NLRB v. R.C. Can Co.,'8 in which the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld a Board determination that an employer committed
an unfair labor practice by its delay in rehiring "wildcat strikers." Eight
of 50 employees had staged a walkout while bargaining was in progress,
notwithstanding opposition to the strike by the union representative.
After negotiations were concluded, the employer delayed three weeks in
rehiring the strikers. The court, finding the sole reason for the delay
to have been the employees' participation in the strike and holding that
the strike was a protected activity, concluded that the delay in rehiring
the employees interfered with their section 7 rights. Suggesting that
independent minority activity in support of the union position does
not contravene the underlying rationale of section 9 that the employer
not be required to choose among various employee positions, the court
qualified its holding, however, with the statement that supportive
activity is protected only as long as "the means used do not involve a
disagreement with, repudiation or criticism of, a policy or decision
previously taken by the union such as, for example, a no strike pledge,
a cooling off period, or the like during negotiations." 19 Thus, under
this view, minority groups of employees may act independently of the
union only if the conduct is supportive of the union position and has
not been foreclosed by the union in its agreements with the employer. 20
17. 145 F.2d at 203.
18. 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964), enforcing 140 N.L.R.B. 588, 52 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1963).
19. 328 F.2d at 979.
20. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears to have retreated
somewhat from its holding in R.C. Can Co. In NLRB v. Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d
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Application of Self-Help to Racial Discrimination
In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 21 two white employees
sought to persuade their employer to hire black workers. During this
effort, one of the advocates was involved in a minor traffic accident
while working and was dismissed. Believing that dismissal was actually
a response to his attempts to secure employment for blacks, he picketed
his former employer. Upon joining this protest, the second employee
was also dismissed. In determining whether these activities were pro-
tected by the Act, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the R.C. Can Co. rationale22 and adhered to that of Draper.2 1 It was
held that the two employees "had an obligation to go to the union with
their desire for non-discriminatory hiring," 24 the court observing that
section 7 does not protect self-help activities when formal avenues of
protest are ignored.
The Tanner decision has evoked considerable discussion, 5 including
the suggestion by one commentator that the decision fails to provide a
786 (5th Cir. i970), 38 employees were discharged for staging a walkout over the dis-
charge of. another employee. They engaged in picketing with the support of the
union's international field representative, but the union itself termed the strike un-
authorized. Although holding the walkout to be unprotected, the court stated: "Ve do
not hold that there cannot be circumstances in which an employee or a minority group
of employees may engage, without reference of the matter to union processes, in
action which is protected under Section 7 though there is an agreement in force or
in the process of negotiations." Id. at 791. See also NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S.
332, 344 (1939) ("The Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation
by the employee of his agreement, any more than it prohibits such discharge for a tort
committed against the employer."). But see Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557 (10th
Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Western Contracting
Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
21. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969), denying enforcement to 166 N.L.R.B. 551, 65
L.R.R.M. 1502 (1967).
22. The Board in Tanner had adopted the reasoning of R.C. Can Co., stating:
[T]he employees were not acting in derogation of their established bargain-
ing agent by seeking to eliminate what they deemed to be a morally un-
conscionable, if. not an unlawful, condition of employment. In these circum-
stances, we are unable to find that the Union's status as the employees'
exclusive bargaining agent was infringed, imperiled, or otherwise under-
mined when the employees engaged in a concerted effort to secure racially
integrated working conditions.
166 N.L.R.B. at 551, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1503 (footnote omitted).
28. See notes 16-17 supra & accompanying text.
24. 419 F.2d at 221.
25. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1967); Gould, supra note 12; Gould,
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satisfactory reconciliation of the possibly inconsistent statutory schemes
designed to effectuate broad public policies in the areas of labor relations
and civil rights.26 Were judicial bodies to adhere strictly to the traditional
principle of exclusive representation, as did the court in Tanner, the
equally desirable public policy opposing racial discrimination might be
vitiated when the two policies conflict. The problem is particularly
acute in situations where a racial minority is unable to enforce con-
tractual remedies through legitimate channels controlled by an unre-
sponsive majority. Strict enforcement of a requirement that the minority
group proceed exclusively through its "chosen representative" could
eliminate the collective bargaining process from the repertoire of
remedies available for racial discrimination.
Just as it has been argued that Tanner dangerously extends the prin-
ciple of exclusivity, it may be suggested that the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit recently reached the opposite extreme
in Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB27 by its
reversal of a Board decision 2s dismissing a section 8 (a) (1)29 complaint
against the employer. The company and the union representing the em-
ployees had entered into a collective bargaining agreement which in-
cluded an anti-discrimination clause, a grievance procedure providing
for binding arbitration, and provisions forbidding strikes and lockouts.
Black employees presented allegations to the union that the company
was discriminating against racial minorities. After an investigation, a
union committee reported that the company likely was discriminating
in violation of the contract and recommended that a grievance be filed.
Some black employees, unsatisfied with this means of redress, suggested
that the union picket the store, but the union rejected this proposal,
claiming it was bound by its arbitration agreement. The disgruntled
employees, nevertheless, began picketing and distributing handbills to
customers. Despite warnings from the union as well as the employer,
the picketing continued and the employees were discharged.
Black Power in the Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships,
79 YALE LJ. 46 (1969); Koretz & Rabin, The Development and History of Protected
Concerted Activity, 24 SYRACuSE L. REv. 715 (1973).
26. See Gould, supra note 12, at 1086.
27. 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Organization, 42 U.S..W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974)
(Nos. 73-696 & 73-830).
28. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 77 L.R.RAI. 1669 (1971).
29. See note 9 supra.
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The Board adopted the findings of the trial examiner that the activities,
although concerted, were unprotected because of the failure of the
employees first to press their grievances through the union representa-
tive. 0 Reversing the Board's decision, the court of appeals3 suggested
that self-help activities in response to alleged racial discrimination should
be accorded treatment different from other independent activities since
the right of minority employees to receive nondiscriminatory treatment
is protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 After
adopting the Tanner requirement that employees attempt to proceed
through their union before acting independently, the Western Addition
court resolved the issue not reached in Tanner, that is, the extent to
which employees must defer to the union prior to taldng independent
action. The court held that unless, when racial discrimination is at issue,
the union is "actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest
extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means," z3 the
independent activity of the minority will not lose its protected status
under section 7.14
30. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971). It recently has been
suggested that "concerted" activity should no longer be required to gain protection
under section 7 of the NLRA. See Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and In-
dividual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972).
31. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972). The court found it significant that, in addition to establishing the
right to nondiscriminatory treatment, Title VII forbids the discharge of employees
who protest discriminatory employer practices. Id. § 2000e-3. Thus, Title VII protects
both the subject matter of the protest and the right to protest. 485 F.2d at 927.
33. 485 F.2d at 931. In dissent, Judge Wyzanski suggested that the majority's analysis
be carried one step further to create an exception to the exclusivity principle for
all cases involving allegations of racial discrimination. id. at 936. His reasoning is
similar in several respects to that presented in Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The
Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969). Rather than
advocating a uniform exception to section 9 in all discrimination cases, however, Pro-
lessor Gould calls for a balancing process in which the availability of protection would
depend upon such factors as the importance of the issues to the original parties to the
agreement, the extent to which the employees are affected by the alleged dis-
criminatory conduct, and the extent to which the union is cooperating with the
employees in their attempts to secure nondiscriminatory treatment. Id. at 64-68.
See generally Hain, Black Workers Versus White Unions: Alternative Strategies in
the Construction Industry, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 37 (1969).
34. As a result of the court's holding, the'employees could not be fired for engaging
in the picketing unless the union's conduct met the stringent test of being "the most ex-
pedient and efficacious means" of handling 'the alleged discrimination. The employees
could be discharged, however, for any other just reason. For example, the court sug-
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Clearly, the test formulated by the court in Western Addition gives
minority employees substantially more latitude in cases involving allega-
tions of racial discrimination than in situations where other conditions
of employment are at issue. In ordinary cases, under the Tanner rule,
individual employees are free to act independently of the union only
if the union breaches its duty of fair representation, which, as will be
indicated, amounts only to an obligation to act in "good faith." 11 Under
the holding in Western Addition, minority employees alleging racial
discrimination need not establish bad faith on the part of the union.36
Indeed, there is language in the opinion indicating that such employees
need only have reason to believe that a better approach is available than
that pursued by the bargaining representative.3 7 The ease with which
such a position could be established is demonstrated by the statement
in a footnote to the majority opinion that it was "impossible to de-
termine" whether the union and the minority group approaches were
gested that employee disloyalty would be a valid ground for dismissal. Such a dis-
missal would be based upon the holding in NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464
(1953), where employees distributed leaflets attacking the quality of their employer's
broadcast programming. In upholding the dismissal of those who took part in the
distribution, the Supreme Court relied on the "disparaging statements" which were made
in a manner reasonably calculated to harm the reputation of the station. Id. at 471.
The employees who engaged in the picketing in Western Addition distributed hand-
bills which made the following accusations:
BEVARE EMPORIUM SHOPPERS
BOYCOTT IS ON!!!
FOR YEARS AT THE EMPORIUM BLACK, BROWN, YELLOW,
AND RED PEOPLE, HAVE WORKED AT THE LOWEST JOBS, AT
THE LOWEST LEVELS. TIME AND AGAIN WE HAVE SEEN IN-
TELLIGENT HARD WORKING BROTHERS AND SISTERS DE-
NIED PROMOTIONS AND BASIC RESPECT.
THE EMPORIUM IS A 20TH CENTURY COLONIAL PLANTATION
THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS ARE BEING TREATED THE SAME
WAY AS OUI BROTHERS ARE BEING TREATED IN THE SLAVE
MINES OF SOUTH AFRICA.
WHENEVER THE RACIST PIG AT THE EMPORIUM INJURES OR
HARMS A BLACK SISTER OR BROTHER, THEY INJURE AND IN-
SULT ALL BLACK PEOPLE. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY FOR
THESE INSULTS. THEREFORE, WE ENCOURAGE ALL OF OUR
PEOPLE TO TAKE THEIR MONEY OUT OF THIS RACIST STORE,
UNTIL BLACK PEOPLE HAVE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND ARE
PROMOTED JUSTLY THROUGHOUT THE EMPORIUM.
485 F.2d at 922.
35. See notes 50-70 infra & accompanying text.
36. 485 F.2d at 930.
37. Id. at 931.
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in fact different,3" let alone whether one approach was superior. When
the holding is examined in light of this statement, it is difficult to con-
ceive of circumstances in which a minority group would be unable to
justify its independent activity. 9
Although the result in Western Addition unquestionably simplifies
matters for minority employees seeking to alleviate discriminatory con-
ditions of employment and thereby furthers the national policy expressed
in civil rights legislation, the real value of that result cannot be deter-
mined without first assessing its potential costs in terms of impeding the
national policy of pursuing industrial peace. In this regard, two areas
in which the Western Addition approach would have disruptive impact
are immediately apparent. First, some dissension within a union is ine-
vitable when different standards are applied to separate groups of em-
ployees, each with legitimate protests. 40 Second, since the availability
of protection for self-help employee activity under the Vestern Addi-
tion formula in no way turns upon the culpability of the employer, the
potential for unjustified disruption of the employer's business is great.
Often in its agreement with the union, the employer has made con-
cessions to ensure that the company will not be faced with disruptive
activities during the period of the agreement.41 To allow this protection
to be circumvented as a result of the union's failure to press allegations
of racial discrimination in the manner desired by a minority appears
inequitable. Under the result in Western Addition, however, employees
apparently may utilize methods of protest foreclosed to the union under
the collective agreement,42 even absent a showing that those portions of
38. Id. at 930 nA0.
39. Thus, as a practical matter, the Western Addition test as applied by the majority
amounts to the broad exception to section 9 advocated by the dissent. See note 33
supra.
40. United Parcel Service, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 84 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1973), the only
self-help case decided by the Board since Western Addition, demonstrates that different
standards are to be applied to racial issues than to other conditions of employment. In
United Parcel the Board read Western Addition as giving full recognition to the ex-
clusivity principle with the single exception of issues involving racial discrimination.
84 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
41. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957)
("[Tihe agreement to arbitrate grievances is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to
strike.').
42. The collective agreement in Western Addition contained a no-strike clause as
well as a general arbitration provision. 485 F.2d at 920. Although picketing was not
explicitly proscribed by the contract, such a proscription may reasonably be inferred
from the general provisions. 192 N.L.R.B. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1670-71.
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the agreement were invalidated either by unfair employer conduct43
or a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 44
These problems are compounded by uncertainties of application of the
court's test. For example, substantial difficulties will undoubtedly arise
in distinguishing, from other conditions of employment where the prin-
ciple of exclusivity should apply, issues genuinely isolated to a minor-
ity. 11 Moreover, although Western Addition dealt only with one group
of dissenting employees, the test presumably would extend protection
to the independent activities of several racial minorities or even several
self-appointed representatives of the same minority.46 Similarly, the
court's reasoning is applicable by analogy to other than racial minori-
ties,47 since the decision is premised upon Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which proscribes discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 48 The difficulty in limiting
the application of the test would certainly appear to inject into the
labor arena precisely the instability and disruption that national labor
policy has attempted to avoid.
It has been argued persuasively that the national policy of eliminating
discriminatory employment practices outweighs any disadvantages
which may result from excepting racial issues from the exclusivity prin-
ciple.49 Nevertheless, it would seem that a remedy of self-help may be
undesirable, and indeed unwarranted, if there are practicable alternatives
43. Where the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice, contract provisions
which limit the means of protest by employees, including no-strike provisions, are
unenforceable. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The court in
WVestern Addition, however, did not reach the question whether the company was
guilty of discrimination. Moreover, discrimination by the employer may not constitute
an unfair labor practice. See note 65 infra.
44. Where the union breaches its duty of fair representation, the employee is no
longer bound by contract provisions limiting his remedies to grievance procedures.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Since the union's duty of fair representation was
not at issue in Western Addition, however, this rule could not have been the basis for
the protection afforded the picketing.
45. For a discussion of such questions as whether negotiations concerning holiday
status for the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King can be distinguished from other
issues left to the union, see Gould, supra note 33, at 64.
46. See 87 H.Av. L. REv. 656, 662 (1974).
47. See generally Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1973); Parmer
v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Bremer v. St.
Louis Southwestern R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as anended (Supp. II, 1972).
49. Gould, supra note 33, at 66.
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which can be utilized toward the same objective without jeopardizing
industrial peace. Consequently, an evaluation of available alternatives,
both within the framework of labor relations law and in relevant civil
rights legislation, must be undertaken.
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES WITHIN THE TRADITIONAL LABOR PROCESS
Duty of Fair Representation
The principle of exclusivity enunciated in section 9 of the NLRA is
premised in part upon the proposition that an employer should not be
required to select among conflicting employee positions; differences of
opinion among union members should be resolved internally, with the
bargaining representative thereafter presenting the majority position to
the employer. A system in which the will of the majority prevails, how-
ever, carries with it a potential for abuse. For example, where black
employees are forced by the exclusivity principle to attack discrimina-
tory employment practices through a union controlled by whites, the
union's power structure may be unwilling to act affirmatively to protect
the interests of the minority.
In theory, protection has been afforded against such abuse through
a judicially established doctrine calculated to guarantee fair treatment
to minority employees by their unions.50 In Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
iville Railroad,5' decided under the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme
Court announced that each union must "act on behalf of all the em-
ployees which, by virtue of the statute, it undertakes to represent." 12
Specifically, it must "represent non-union or minority union members
of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in
good faith." 51 In Steele, blacks had been excluded from the union
which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent. When the union and
employer sought to eliminate blacks from their jobs as firemen by agree-
ing to limit their employment, the union was held to have violated its
duty of fair representation.5 4
50. See generally Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 Mi. L. REv. 113 (1964); Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962).
51. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
52. Id. at 199.
53. Id. at 204.
54. For a discussion of the "victory" won by the minority, see Herring, supra note
SO, at 115.
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The duty of fair representation was first held applicable under the
NLRA in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,55 the Supreme Court, however,
reserving to the unions substantial latitude in exercising that duty: "Ine-
vitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms
of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of
employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them
invalid." 16 Nevertheless, it would appear that racial discrimination by
a union is a breach of the duty of fair representation 57 for which the
employee is entitled to an award of damages. 58 It is less clear whether
such a breach constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(b) (1) (A) of the NLRA.59
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in NLRB v.
Miranda Fuels Co."0 that racial discrimination by a union does not con-
stitute an unfair labor practice unless it is "deliberately designed to en-
courage membership in the union." 61 In Local 12, United Rubber
Tjorkers v. NLRB, 62 however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld a decision of the Board that racial discrimination by the
union, because it was a breach of the duty of fair representation, con-
stituted an unfair labor practice. The court reasoned that "the duty of
fair representation implicit in the exclusive-representation requirement
in section 9 (a) of the act comprises an indispensable element of the right
of employees 'to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing' as guaranteed in section 7." 63 United Rubber Workers
was expressly followed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers In-
ternational Union v. NLRB. 64 Since the Board may always seek enforce-
ment of its orders in the District of Columbia Circuit, a practical con-
55. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
56. Id. at 338. Accord, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
57. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
58. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
59. Such discrimination may also violate section 8(b) (2) or 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(b) (2), (3) (1970). Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.RJB. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289"
(1964).
60. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), denying enforcement to 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M_
1584 (1962).
61. 326 F.2d at 180.
62. 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
63. 368 F.2d at 17.
64. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
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clusion is that union discrimination on the basis of race is to be viewed
as an unfair labor practice, notwithstanding the split among the circuits."5
More importantly, a union's breach of its duty to represent all em-
ployees fairly may render inapplicable the section 9 restrictions on an
aggrieved employee's section 7 self-help rights. Ordinarily, when a
union has contracted to resolve grievances by means of arbitration, each
employee, whether union or non-union, is bound to honor that agree-
ment under the principle of exclusivity. In Vaca v. Sipes,6" however,
the Supreme Court held that, upon proof that the union has breached
its duty of fair representation, an aggrieved employee is entitled to
ignore such contractual limitations and sue the employer for breach of
contract. Arguably, the Court's rationale would apply equally to limi-
tations placed upon an employee's rights to strike or picket. Although
the Western Addition court appeared to accept this analogy when it
acknowledged that proof of the union's bad faith would have justified
independent concerted activities by its members, 7 its decision was pre-
mised, not upon a finding of bad faith, but merely upon a showing that
the union failed to remedy discrimination "to the fullest extent possible"
by the most efficacious means. Limiting self-help to situations in which
a union has failed to represent all employees fairly, it is submitted, would
be far less disruptive of the bargaining process than the result in Western
Addition.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of fair representation is not as effective a
weapon in combating racial discrimination as the Western Addition ap-
proach. A union could, for a multitude of reasons, be unwilling to press
vigorously an employee's charges of discrimination without thereby
being guilty of bad faith.18 Moreover, even if the union's representation
is unfair, such a breach of its duty, if sufficiently subtle, could easily
evade detection.69 It has been suggested that some deficiencies of the
65. Note that discriminatory conduct by an employer is not necessarily an unfair
labor practice, even though similar conduct would be a violation if performed by the
union. See Jubilee Mfg. Co, 212 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973) ("[D]iscrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, standing alone, which is all
that is alleged herein, is not 'inherently destructive' of employees' Section 7 rights and
therefore is not violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act.").
66. 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
67. 485 F.2d at 930-31.
68. Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His
Union, 41 U. ix. L. REv. 55 (1972). See also Herring, supra note 50.
69. Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement As a Limitation on Union Control
of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1036 (1970).
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good faith test of fair representation might be overcome by shifting the
burden to the union to establish its good faith.70 Even such a change,
however, would hardly provide an employee remedy as efficacious as
the self-help approach endorsed in Western Addition. Hence, notwith-
standing that employee remedies under the doctrine of fair representa-
tion are less disruptive of the collective bargaining system, it is neces-
sary to look elsewhere for an alternative to employee self-help with com-
parable potential for combating racial discrimination.
Grievance and Arbitration Procedures
Section 9(a) of the NLRA reserves to individual employees "the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted .... ,, 71 Such a right, however, may not be as
valuable as it first appears, since the express terms of this qualification
to the principle of exclusive bargaining prevent any adjustment incon-
sistent with the collective bargaining agreement.7 2 One commentator 73
interprets the proviso merely to permit, rather than require, an employer
to accept grievances from its employees.74 Indeed, such an interpreta-
tion appears to have been adopted by the Supreme Court.75
Although individual rights to process grievances may well be absorbed
by the union, grievance procedures and arbitration have been empha-
sized, by those advocating their use, as effective methods to combat
racial discrimination. 7 Some of the strongest support for arbitration as
a means of settling labor disputes has come from the Supreme Court.
70. See Tobias, supra note 68.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit... Provided, that any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, that the bargaining representative has been given oppor-
tunity to be present at such adjustment.
72. Id.
73. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rxv. 601 (1956).
74. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
75. See notes 93-95 infra & accompanying text.
76. Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected
Perspectives, 24 ME. L. REv. 215, 220 (1972).
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In the celebrated Steelworkers Trilogy,7" the Court stressed the goal
of American labor policy to promote industrial peace. Such stabilization,
the Court concluded, can best be achieved through the use of arbitra-
tion and grievance machinery. Congress likewise has expressed support
for settlement of industrial disputes through such processes. Section 203
of the Labor-Management Relations Act states that "final adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 7.3
A number of commentators, nevertheless, have questioned the useful-
ness of the grievance mechanism in remedying racial discrimination.7
It has been suggested that the arbitrator may be placed in an untenable
position if he should find it necessary to decide against either the com-
pany or the union when a grievance has been processed by an individual
black worker or a minority group. 0 Moreover, such institutional limita-
tions as selection of the arbitrator by the company and the union and
the arbitrator's unfamiliarity with extra-contractual sources of law
tend to undermine the usefulness of this procedure to settle racial
grievances.
Such defects, however, are not inherent in the concept of an arbitra-
tion system. A few basic, yet relatively simple, changes in the current
system could well equip the arbitration procedure to deal with charges
of employment discrimination, thereby foreclosing the perceived neces-
sity for resort to self-help. Some commentators, for example, have pro-
posed tripartite arbitration in which the racial minority would appoint
one member."' Such a plan could remove the inherent problems asso-
ciated with an arbitration proceeding controlled by the very parties ac-
cused of the discrimination. Another suggested approach is to require
77. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1970).
79. See generally Blumrosen, Civil Rights Conflicts: The Uneasy Search for Peace
in Our Time, 27 AmR. J. 35 (1972); Gould, supra note 33, at 48.
80. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting
Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 30 (1971).
81. Bloch, Race Discrimination in Industry and the Grievance Process, 21 LABOR L.J.
627 (1970); Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 20
SYRACUSE L. REv. 865 (1969).
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quotas of racial minorities in top union positions."2 Such proposals
would have the advantage of retaining the desirable aspects of the ex-
clusive bargaining concept while guaranteeing greater protection for
minorities.
Section 301(a) Contract Actions
In 1947, Congress authorized the federal courts to entertain suits for
alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements. Under section
301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,83 suit may be brought,
for example, to compel arbitration,8 4 to enforce no-strike clauses,85 or
to redress a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. 6 The Su-
preme Court first construed section 301 (a) in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 7 in which the employer had agreed to a grievance and
arbitration procedure in return for a no-strike clause and a union pledge
against work stoppages. When a dispute arose concerning the applica-
bility of the grievance procedure to a particular topic, the union sued
under section 301 (a) to compel arbitration. Ordering arbitration, the
Court held that, rather than merely establishing jurisdiction, the section
permits the district courts to fashion substantive federal law to govern
the availability of new remedies for the enforcement of collective bar-
gaining contracts.88
82. Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger
Court, 68 MicH. L. REv. 237 (1969); cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties." See generally Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the
NLR.B, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1963).
84. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
85. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
86. See notes 96-97 infra & accompanying text.
87. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
88. The Court observed:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive
law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations.
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of. express statutory mandates.
Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at
the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate
that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem.
_d. at 457.
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One potential limitation upon the availability of relief under section
301 (a) concerned the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB in cases in-
volving unfair labor practices.8 9 In situations in which an alleged viola-
tion of a contract provision cognizable under section 301 (a) arguably
constituted an unfair labor practice as well, it was unclear whether the
Board would have exclusive jurisdiction of the dispute notwithstanding
section 301 (a). That question was addressed by the Supreme Court
in Smith v. Evening News Association," in which the contract provision
in question prohibited the employer from discriminating against union
members. Since a breach of that provision would likewise constitute an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA,0 ' the em-
ployer sought to have the action transferred to the NLRB. Rejecting this
request, the Supreme Court stated: "The authority of the Board to deal
with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining
contract is not displaced by section 301, but it is not exclusive and does
not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under section 301." 91
An employee's right to sue under section 301 (a) is significantly
limited, however, where the bargaining agreement contains a grievance
procedure. The policy of judicial deference to grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures was enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy,3 the Su-
preme Court stating that judicial review in such cases is limited to a
determination whether the dispute is within the ambit of the contract
procedure. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 4 employees brought
suit to obtain severance pay without first utilizing the applicable griev-
ance procedure. Concluding that the contract action was barred, the
Supreme Court held that "in cases to which federal law applies, federal
labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert con-
tract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure
agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress." 11
89. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon,
259 U.S. 236 (1959).
90. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ...
92. 371 U.S. at 197.
93. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
94. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
95. Id. at 652.
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Nevertheless, if a union refuses to press a grievance to arbitration, an
employee may seek, through section 301 (a), to pursue his claim in the
courts. In Vaca v. Sipes,96 an employee alleged that he had been dis-
charged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that the
union had acted "arbitrarily, capriciously and without just or reason-
able reason or cause" in refusing to process the grievance. The Court
held that an employee "may bring an action against his employer in the
face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies,
provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent
breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's
grievance." 91 The duty would be breached, however, only if the union's
refusal to proceed was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Moreover, it was held in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco RailWay9 8
that a showing that it would be futile to pursue grievance procedures
through the union obviates the necessity of pursuing such action. In
Glover, a black employee alleged that the employer and union had
agreed to exclude black employees from positions as "carmen." It is
doubtful, nevertheless, that Glover can be read to sanction bypassing
applicable grievance procedures by a mere allegation of racial discrim-
ination,99 since in that case an attempt to proceed through the union had
been made in the form of complaints to both company and union.10
Thus, the efficacy of a section 301 (a) action to remedy discrimination,
notwithstanding the "futile actions" exception, is severely limited when
a grievance procedure is outlined in the contract. To circumvent this
mechanism an employee must establish a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation, clearly a difficult burden of proof.10'
To an employee seeling redress for racially discriminatory employ-
ment practices, the expanded self-help approach of Western Addition
would appear more attractive than the remedies currently available in
96. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Note, Individual Control over Personal Grievances
under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE LJ. 559 (1968).
97. 386 U.S. at 186. Although the language of Vaca appeared to provide hope for
the individual employee suing under section 301 (a), subsequent decisions have severely
limited the ability of employees to show a union breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co, 483 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1973); Buzzard
v. Machinists, Local 1040, 480 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973); Reid v. UAW, Local 1093, 479
F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1973).
98. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
99. See Gould, supra note 33, at 52.
100. 393 U.S. at 331.
101. See notes 68-70 & 97 supra & accompanying text.
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the labor relations area. It should be noted, however, that adoption of
such proposals as shifting the burden of proof to the union under the
doctrine of fair representation, utilizing tripartite arbitration, and as-
suring minority representation among union leadership'02 could enhance
significantly the utility of the traditional labor remedies in eliminating
discrimination. In any event, alternatives to self-help as means for ob-
taining redress for allegedly discriminatory employment practices are not
limited to the area of labor relations law. A thorough evaluation of reme-
dies for racial discrimination in employment requires a discussion and
analysis of applicable civil rights legislation.
REMEDIES UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The foregoing analysis illustrates congressional and -judicial at-
tempts to devise an optimum procedure to achieve redress of employee
grievances while maintaining industrial peace. Such legislative and judi-
cial action, although directed primarily toward employee grievances in
general, has, in the wake of national efforts to achieve equality among
the races, been applied to the specific issue of racial discrimination.
Paralleling the application of traditional labor procedures in this area,
Congress and the courts have focused their efforts and attention upon
civil rights legislation as an additional means to end employment dis-
crimination.
Congress has responded to the changing national mood in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972,14 while the federal courts, looldng back
a century to another era of concern with racial prejudice, have resur-
rected the Civil Rights Act of 1866.15 The following analysis will
focus upon means provided by these enactments for an employee to
remedy racial discrimination in employment. These avenues of redress
generally compliment those existing within the traditional labor frame-
work and evidence the lack of justification for the extension of self-help
remedies in Western Addition.
102. See notes 70, 81 & 82 supra & accompanying text.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §5 2000e-2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
104. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). For a general discussion of the 1972
Act, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WAsH. L. %kv. 824 (1972).
105. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The portion of section 1 of the Act
which concerns a person's right to make contracts was reenacted in the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Star. 144, and is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In enacting Title VII, Congress enunciated a national policy against
racial discrimination in employment and established a comprehensive
administrative and judicial procedure for remedying inequities. The
statute explicitly prohibits racial discrimination in employment on the
part of an employer,' employment agency,0 7 or labor organization.0 8
The comprehensiveness of the prohibition is constrained, however, by
the narrow definition of employer, which, although expanded in 1972,
still excludes a substantial portion of the total labor force from Title VII
protection.0 9
106. The amended Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972), a-nending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or other-
wise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
108. The amended Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for mem-
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any indi-
vidual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an appli-
cant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
109. The amended Act provides: "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such a person . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972). In
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
created to oversee the accomplishment of the Act's purposes. 110 Ini-
tially, the primary duties of the EEOC were to investigate possible
instances of discrimination and to utilize informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion to achieve voluntary compliance by
the employer.' Although an aggrieved party was authorized to institute
legal proceedings," 2 the Commission was not empowered to pursue in-
dependent legal action. The 1972 amendments, while continuing to
recognize a private party's right of action, authorize the EEOC to
bring suit in federal district court against a nongovernmental employer
who refuses to discontinue voluntarily a discriminatory employment
practice." 3
Engrafted upon the administrative and judicial actions established
under Title VII are complex procedural requirements which are pre-
requisites to redress. To initiate either type of action, an employee who
believes he is the subject of discrimination must file a charge with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation." 4 If the Commission
the original Act, the minimum number of employees was 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1970). The statutory minimums clearly exclude from the protection of Title VII
those employees who work for small enterprises. Moreover, the definition of "employer"
excludes bona fide private membership clubs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
For a discussion of remedies available to employees excluded from Title VII coverage,
see the discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, notes 168-214 infra & accompanying
text.
The United States government and corporations owned by the federal government are
not employers under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Because the
issue herein is employment discrimination in the private sector, a discussion of remedies
for governmental discrimination is beyond the scope of this Note.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
111. Id. § 20OOe-5(a).
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (Supp. I, 1972). Under the 1964 Act, the Attorney
General possessed authority to bring an action when he had reasonable cause to believe
that there existed a pattern or practice of refusal to comply with the statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a) (1970). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 in no way
detracted from the authority of the Attorney General to institute an action in such
circumstances; the amendments merely augmented this power by vesting in the Com-
mission authority to bring suits, thereby lessening the need for action by the Attorney
General.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (Supp. 11, 1972). The length of time was previously only
half that amount. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1970). Presently, an extension is allowed
where the party has previously filed a complaint with a state or local agency: the peti-
tioner in such a case must file with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged violation
or 30 days from the termination of the state or local action, whichever is earlier. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
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dismisses the charge, or if 180 days have elapsed since the charge was
filed and the EEOC has not commenced a civil action, the employee
is to be so notified, whereupon he may institute court proceedings within
90 days."6 The concept of federalism is evident in Title VII, provision
having been made for temporary EEOC deferral to an appropriate
state or local agency when that state or political subdivision has a law
prohibiting the alleged discriminatory employment practice." 6
The administrative procedures created by Title VII, evidencing a con-
gressional intent to provide an expeditious means of resolving issues of
racial discrimination without unnecessarily involving the federal courts,
parallel the recognized national policy favoring nonjudicial resolution
of employment disputes in general. The EEOC and state or local agen-
cies serve as nonjudicial arenas in which discriminatory conditions can
be rectified through the utilization of informal administrative proceed-
ings and direct conciliation between the parties, thereby reducing the
likelihood of eventual resort to the courts. Moreover, the policy of
deferral to an existing state or local agency recognizes the contribution
which states can make in the effort to eliminate employment discrimina-
tion. At the same time, deferral to subnational agencies is not absolute
and will not preclude subsequent consideration of the allegation by the
EEOC or federal courts.
Although emphasizing administrative procedures to remedy racial dis-
crimination, Congress in Title VII provided for resort to federal courts
when voluntary attempts at administrative solution prove inadequate or
unsuccessful. During its efforts to achieve voluntary resolution of a
dispute, the EEOC may institute an injunctive action for appropriate
preliminary relief pending final disposition of the charge under consid-
eration.117 Upon failure of the administrative effort to effectuate a vol-
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972). The original lengths of time were
one-third the present: 60 days until notification of the right to sue and 30 days there-
after to bring suit in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
116. When a state or local law exists, a party cannot file a charge with the EEOC
until 60 days after the commencement of proceedings under such law, unless the state
proceedings are terminated within that time. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
If a charge is filed with the EEOC and there exists an applicable state or local law, the
Commission must defer its consideration of the charge, affording the state agency a
reasonable time to remedy the alleged discrimination, generally not less than 60 days
unless the agency requests a shorter period. Id. § 2000e-5 (d).
117. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (2). The grant of authority to seek temporary relief is not
general but is to be utilized when a preliminary investigation leads the Commission to
conclude that prompt judicial action is necessary to fulfill the purposes of Tide VII.
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untary settlement, the EEOC or the complaining party may institute
an action in federal court to seek the judicial relief provided by the
Act.11 A determination that the defendant intentionally engaged in
racial discrimination authorizes the district court to grant a variety of
remedies, including hiring or reinstatement of the employee and an award
of back pay. 9 In addition, the court may order any other equitable
relief which it deems appropriate.120
The avenues of administrative and judicial redress available under
Title VII are capable of providing all the relief against employer dis-
crimination -which could be obtained within the traditional labor rela-
tions framework: prohibition against future discrimination, reinstate-
ment of the employee, and financial recovery for past discrimination.
With these modes of relief available under the amended Civil Rights
Act of 1964, expanded self-help for employees as suggested in Western
Addition appears unnecessary; indeed, in light of the burdens it could
impose upon the labor relations process, the Western Addition remedy
appears unjustified. Title VII, it is submitted, provides a more appropri-
ate forum to remedy racial discrimination in employment while maxi-
mizing industrial peace.
Judicial Remedies under Title VII
The judicial remedies provided in Title VII have proved effective,
despite attempts to block court action because of alleged procedural
defects.12' Generally, the courts have dealt with the procedural require-
ments with the objectives of the legislation clearly in mind and without
a crippling concern for technicality. One court has observed that "the
procedures of Title VII were [not] intended to serve as a stumbling
block to the accomplishment of the statutory objective." 122 Although
filing a charge with the EEOC within the prescribed time is a clear pre-
requisite to instituting a civil action under Title VII,123 various courts,
118. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
119. Id. § 20O0e-5(g).
120. Id.
121. See generally Sutter, Current Procedural and Evidentiary Considerations under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Ready for the Defense, 6 GA. L. REv. 505
(1972).
122. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1969).
123. See, e.g., Local 719, United Textile Workers v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1972); Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC
Corp., 456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455
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cognizant of the remedial purposes of the statute, have deemphasized
the niceties of formal legal pleading 124 and minimized the effect on action
by the Commission and district courts of the required referral to state
agencies.12 5 One court has reasoned that a purpose of the statute is
to "give respectful but modest deference to a state that has evidenced
interest." 121
(5th Cir. 1970); Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry, 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968).
A recent case evidences the minimal burdens of the statutory procedures. Although
one party filed his charge with the EEOC seven days after the statutory limit, his claim
was allowed because his two co-plaintiffs had filed their charges within the required
time. The court, reasoning that the employer had notice and therefore was not
prejudiced by the late filing, observed: "Title VII is a remedial act, and the con-
gressional purpose would not be furthered by requiring strict adherence to every pro-
cedural technicality." Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 663 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
It has also been held that invocation by an employee of a contractual grievance pro-
cedure tolls the statutory requirement that a charge be filed with the EEOC within a
certain period, now 180 days, after the alleged discriminatory act. See, e.g., Malone v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1972); Hutchings v. United States
Indus., Inc, 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d
888 (5th Cir. 1970).
124. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969). The same court,
in an earlier decision, focused specifically on the need to avoid pleading technicalities:
"For a lay-initiated proceeding it would be out of keeping with the Act to import
common-law pleading niceties to this 'charge,' or in turn to hog-tie the subsequent law-
suit to any such concepts. All that is required is that it give sufficient information to
enable EEOC to see what the grievance is about." Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28, 30 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968). See also District of Columbia Human Relations Comm'n
v. National Geographic Soc'y, 475 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Tipler v. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32
(4th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowaters
S. Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 428 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);
United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prod. Corp, 426 F.2d 539 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
125. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Richard v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249 (Sth Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co.,
466 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); Barela v. United Nuclear
Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972); Motorola, Inc. v. EEOC, 460 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.
1972); Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359
(9th Cir. 1972); Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972). It
has been held that where a charge is filed with the Commission and referred to the
appropriate state agency, the charge should be considered in "suspended animation"
during the time of such referral. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972); Moore
v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972); Wimbush v. Froug's Co., 339 F. Supp.
185 (N.D. Okla. 1972).
126. Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 465 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1972).
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An actual attempt at conciliation by the EEOC is not a prerequisite
to suit in the federal courts;127 moreover, an individual may institute a
civil action even if the EEOC has concluded that there exists no reason-
able cause to believe that a Title VII violation has occurred.128 In de-
termining whether an action should be allowed, the courts appear pri-
marily concerned with the requirement that the suit be instituted within
the statutory time limit after receipt of notice from the EEOC that the
employee has a right to sue.' 2 Accordingly, some courts have sum-
marized the prerequisites for federal court action as the mere filing of a
complaint with the Commission and timely action after the subsequent
receipt of a notice of the right to sue. 30
Considering the present judicial disposition to minimize procedural
restrictions, a party alleging racial discrimination is not unduly encum-
bered in his efforts to obtain the relief provided by Title VII. Two
additional elements help remove practical obstacles to the attainment
of appropriate relief: the allowance of class actions 131 and the award
of attorney's fees. The propriety of the former was established judicially
to further the national policy declared in the Act, 32 while Tide VII
itself authorizes the award of reasonable attorney's fees."3
127. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp,
456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136
(5th Cir. 1971); Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Dent v.
St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.,
405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1968).
128. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Jefferson v.
Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972); Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971);
Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers Int'l Union, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
129. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456
F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972); Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969);
Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
130. See, e.g., Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Local 179, United Textile Workers v.
Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Beverly
v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); Culpepper v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
131. See FE. R. Civ. P. 23.
132. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1970).
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The propriety of a class action in any federal civil suit is determined
by the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 4
When these requirements are met, class actions have been held proper
under Title VII to remedy discrimination in employment.135 Indeed, one
court has suggested that "[a] suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily
a class action as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis
of a class characteristic, i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin." 156
Furthermore, a majority of courts considering the point have held that
the Title VII filing prerequisite is met for the entire class when one
member fies with the EEOC a charge representative of the common
grievances, 137 and some have held that the filing party may pursue the
case for the entire class even though he cannot personally recover.'3 "
The allowance of reasonable attorney's fees provides an important
complement to class actions in assisting employees, especially those of
a marginal income level, to combat racial discrimination in employment.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant provision of Title
134. The fundamental prerequisites to maintenance of a class action are: "(1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of. all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FE. R. Civ.
P. 23 (a).
135. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Barela v. United Nuclear Corp, 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Hutchings
v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc.,
423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122
(5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
333 F. Supp. 83 (D. Colo. 1971); Local 186, Intl Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
136. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
supplied).
137. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Bowe v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 186, Int'l Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
138. See, e.g., Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F2d 421 (Sth Cir. 1970); Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
VII' 9 as permitting an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party,
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'10 In
cases in which only part of a claim has been successful, courts have
awarded legal fees allocable to that portion. 41 Moreover, it is clear
that the award of attorney's fees under Title VII is a matter of discre-
tion with district courts; only manifest abuse of that discretion will justi-
fy reversal.142 The award of attorney's fees, then, provides a statutory
capstone to the remedies available under Title VII. Taken alone, Title
VII provides an integrated administrative and judicial program for
remedying racial discrimination in employment. Whether judicial relief
under Title VII may be used to supplement remedies within the tradi-
tional labor framework, however, must yet be considered.
Title VII and the Traditional Labor Process
Were decisions of the National Labor Relations Board or contractual
arbitration procedures to preclude relief under Title VII, the guarantees
and purposes of that statute would be diminished. Fortunately, in de-
veloping the relationship between Title VII and traditional labor reme-
dies, federal courts have recognized the value of both without granting
the latter such weight as to eviscerate the former.
Paralleling holdings that an unfavorable EEOC response to a com-
plaint will not bar a civil action in the federal district courts,' the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has determined that an adverse ruling
by the NLRB does not preclude a suit under Title VII. 44 More often
the federal courts have considered whether the remedies available through
a grievance and arbitration procedure preclude judicial relief under
Title VII. In situations in which the grievance process has not reached
a conclusive stage, the uniform judicial response has been to permit
concurrent pursuit of contractual and statutory relief, usually on the
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
140. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
141. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
See also Silas v. Smith, 361 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
142. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 467 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1972); Barela v. United Nuclear
Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972); Electronics Capital Corp. v. Sheperd, 439 F.2d
692 (Sth Cir. 1971).
143. See note 128 supra & accompanying text.
144. Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding the
proffered defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable).
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grounds that the public policies evidenced in the two procedures should
not be thwarted by requiring an election of remedies.'45
The effect of a binding arbitration award upon the pursuit of statutory
remedies under Title VII has evoked considerably more discussion. 146
Although the Supreme Court has recently held that adjustment of a
grievance by means of arbitration does not preclude a subsequent civil
action under Title VII, the wisdom of this holding can be ascertained
only after a thorough examination of the deferral to arbitration issue.
The controversy arose initially in two circuit court decisions reaching
contrary results. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 47 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a Title VII suit could not be
instituted after the plaintiff had pursued his grievance to final and
binding arbitration. Contemporaneously, litigants presented the same
issue in Hutehings v. United States Industries, Inc., 48 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reaching the opposite conclusion. The
Tenth Circuit thereafter adopted the Dewey rationale,' 49 while the Sixth
Circuit, in Newman v. Avco Corp.,150 distinguished its earlier ruling
145. See, e.g., Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973);
Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859
(1973); Macldin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc, 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rosen-
feld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Fekete v. United States Steel
Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888
(5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). In Bowe
the court stressed that the purpose of the election doctrine could be achieved as long
as the "election of remedy was made after adjudication so as to preclude duplicate
relief which would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the plaintiffs." Id.
at 715 (emphasis supplied).
146. E.g., Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Rights and Remedies, 6
GA. L. REv. 469, 483-86 (1972); Herbert & Reishel, Title VII and the Multiple Ap-
proaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 449 (1971);
Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement, 24 ME. L. Rxv. 215,
222-26 (1972); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies
for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 30 (1971); Note, Title VII, the
NLRB, and Arbitration: Conflicts in National Labor Policy, 5 GA. L. REv. 313 (1971);
Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrator's Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STA-N. L. REv.
421 (1974); Comment, Deferral to Arbitration in Title VII Actions: Rios v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 14 Vm. & MARY L. REv. 1003 (1973); Comment, Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co.: Arbitration and Title VII, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 684 (1971); 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1316 (1970).
147. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
148. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
149. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94
S. Cr. 1011 (1974).
150. 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971).
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and permitted a subsequent Tide VII action, basing that decision, how-
ever, on the peculiar facts presented. An opportunity for the Supreme
Court to provide guidance in the area on the appeal of Dewey was
lost when an evenly divided Court affirmed without opinion.'' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revisited the question in Rios v.
Reyolds Metals Co.,152 reaffirming its position in Hutchings but ac-
knowledging that in certain circumstances a federal court may defer
to an arbitration award.15
These decisions reflected the differing balances struck by the courts
between two clearly desirable national policies. Those circuits which
approved the finality of deferral emphasized the value of the arbitration
process in American labor policy;6 4 those reaching the opposite result
stressed the goal of combating employment discrimination articulated in
Title VII. 15 A balancing of equities led the Dewey court to disallow a
federal court action after the employee had pursued his grievance to
binding arbitration. The court reasoned that, had the arbitration award
been in the employee's favor, the employer would have had no resort
to another forum; hence, it was held inequitable to bind the employer
while permitting an employee a subsequent avenue of redress. 6' Bol-
stering its conclusion, the court stated that postarbitration resort to
Title VII relief would undermine the arbitration process.1 7 On balance,
then, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit exhibited reluctance to
detract from the national policy favoring arbitration in labor disputes,""
even when the claim asserted by the employee rested upon an inde-
pendent statutory base.
151. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
152. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
153. See notes 162-63 infra & accompanying text.
154. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct.
1011 (1974); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
155. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co, 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); Hutchings v. United
States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
156. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 1970). But see
Gould, supra note 33.
157. 429 F.2d at 332.
158. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also Labor-Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29
U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1970) (legislative endorsement of grievance and arbitration mechan-
isms as "the desirable method" of settling labor disputes).
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, in
Hutchings and Rios accorded less weight to arbitration as an obstacle to
court action, placing greater emphasis upon the congressionally enun-
ciated policy in Title VII against employment discrimination.'59 The
court also noted the limitations of the arbitration process as a vehicle
for the effective resolution of disputes over discrimination, limitations
which illustrate the crucial differences between that avenue of redress
and action in federal court. Moreover, discerning that Congress in en-
acting Title VII intended to create an independent and supplemental
remedy, rather than one subordinate to existing remedies in the labor
arena,6 0 the court perceived the federal judiciary as the "final arbiters"
of that statutory program, not to be conclusively restrained by an arbi-
tration award. 6'
Although stressing the rights created by Title VII over the national
policy favoring arbitration, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
did acknowledge the value of the latter. In Rios the court concluded
that in cases where an arbitration procedure achieved completely the
rights and remedies guaranteed under the statute, district courts might
defer to an arbitration agreement. 6 2 The strictness of its test for de-
ferral was viewed by the court as protecting employees against inade-
quacies in the arbitration procedure.'r,
159. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1972); Hutchings v.
United States Indus, Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311-14 (5th Cir. 1970).
160. Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1972).
161. Id.; Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 1970).
162. The Rios court held that lower courts could defer to an arbitration award only
under the following carefully defined circumstances:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrators unless
the contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it
must be plain that the arbitrator's decision is in no way violative of the
private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy which
inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring, the district court must
be satisfied that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those decided
by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agree-
ment to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence pre-
sented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4)
the arbitrator actually decided the factual issues presented to the court;
(5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural
infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing these conditions of limita-
tion will be upon the respondent as distinguished from the claimant.
467 F.2d at 58.
163. See notes 79-80 supra & accompanying text. See also Comment, Deferral to
Arbitration in Title VII Actions: Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 14 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1003, 1011-12 (1973).
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The differences among the circuits were finally resolved when the
Supreme Court recently ruled in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.161
that the federal courts must consider employee charges of discrimination
de novo, notwithstanding that the employee has previously pursued
available grievance procedures to arbitration. Basing its decision upon
the independent statutory basis of the employees' right to nondiscrimina-
tory treatment, the Court reasoned that the decision of an arbitrator,
whose authority extends only to the resolution of contractual disputes,
must depend solely upon the intent of the parties and cannot resolve
extra-contractual rights. It was observed that an employee, however,
in instituting suit to enforce statutory rights, asserts rights independent
of the contract and thus does not seek to overturn the arbitrator's de-
cision. 65 Consequently, the Court refused to hold that doctrines of
waiver or election of remedies or the policy favoring arbitration could
preclude an employee from obtaining a de novo judicial determination
of his rights. While permitting the courts to consider an arbitrator's
decision in a subsequent civil action, the Court refused to adopt any
requirement of deferral.166
Arguably, the result in Gardner-Denver will have undesirable rami-
fications with respect to the willingness of employers to arbitrate dis-
putes involving allegations of discrimination or even to include anti-
discrimination clauses in their contracts. It is clear, nevertheless, that
the decision, by assuring aggrieved employees access to the courts regard-
less of the unwillingness of employers and unions to act affirmatively
to eliminate discrimination, removes potential barriers to the effective-
ness of Title VII as an alternative to the self-help approach of Western
Addition. Moreover, for those employees for whom relief under Title
VII is unavailable because of the exclusion of their employers from its
provisions or because of their failure to comply with its procedural
requirements,1 67 there exists another attractive alternative.
164. 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974).
165. Id. at 1022.
166. The Court reasoned that while a rule of automatic deferral would jeopardize
the goals of Title VII as a result of the practical limitations of arbitration, the adoption
of a strict deferral standard, such as that in Rios, would encourage the introduction
of excessive procedural safeguards into the arbitration process, thus reducing the ability
of that process to function efficiently. Id. at 1024-25.
167. See notes 109 & 114-16 supra & accompanying text.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Arising out of a congressional effort to remove the stigmas attached
to members of the black race by over two centuries of slavery, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866165 provides the potential for a comprehensive
prohibition of racial discrimination in employment. The simple, exact
phrasing of section 1 of the Act assures members of all races equal legal
rights in contractual relations, the judicial process, and property trans-
actions.' A detailed examination of the statute will demonstrate its
value as yet another alternative to the self-help approach of Western
Addition, supplementing both the traditional labor process and Tide
VII.17
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 171 the Supreme Court made the
first modern application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to incidents of
racial discrimination, thus awakening the statute's potential in the labor
arena. The case itself concerned racial discrimination by private per-
sons in property transactions, the alleged discrimination by the de-
fendant being purely the conduct of a private party in no way counten-
anced by state or local law. The Court, unable to rely on the fourteenth
amendment or enactments thereunder since that amendment is phrased
in terms of state action, instead focused upon the long-neglected thir-
168. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
169. Section 1 of the Act provided:
[AIll persons born in the United States ... are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwith-
standing.
Id. i 1.
170. In the few years since judicial attention was redirected toward the 1866 statute,
its application to racial discrimination in employment has been treated extensively
by commentators. See Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for
Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HAuv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 57
(1972); Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Eval-
uation of Forwns, 46 XVAsH. L. REv. 455, 475-79 (1971); Note, A "New" Weapon to Com-
bat Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 29 MD. L. Rv.
158 (1969); Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 615 (1969).
171. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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teenth amendment. Holding that the 1866 Act was a valid exercise of
the power of Congress to enforce the latter amendment, the Court em-
phasized the comprehensiveness of the statutory prohibition concerning
property transactions, now codified as section 1982 of Title 42 of the
United States Code. That provision was held to bar "all racial dis-
crimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property." 172
The Jones v. Mayer rationale is equally applicable to racial discrim-
ination in employment. In assessing the breadth of section 1, the Court
focused upon the structure and legislative history of the statute and
stressed that "Congress meant exactly what it said." 173 Examining the
structure of the Act in its entirety, the Court concluded that a bar to
private discrimination must be recognized in the statute; otherwise,
portions of section 2 regarding exemptions from criminal sanctions
would be meaningless. 7 4 The legislative history of the 1866 Act was
employed to buttress the conclusion that Congress intended section 1
172. id. at 413. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited racial discrimina-
tion affecting both property and contract rights. The prohibition of discrimination
concerning contractual rights was reenacted as section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of
1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, and is presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Hence,
although the codification of section 1981 refers to the later Act, sections 1981 and 1982
both have their origins in the 1866 statute. For a discussion of the relationship of the
1866 and 1870 Acts, see notes 176-81 infra & accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits incidents
of private racial discrimination and its acceptance of the thirteenth amendment as the
foundation for that protection reverses the trend of earlier decisions which had
significantly narrowed the effect of the 1866 statute. The Court had argued previously
that because the second section of the Act was limited to actions under color of state
law, the first section must be similarly limited. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31-32
(1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
317-18 (1879). The Court in Jones v. Mayer dismissed these proffered precedents
as mere dicta. 392 U.S. at 419-20. In Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the
Court had held that section 1981 was not designed to prohibit private acts of diccrim-
ination. The Supreme Court specifically overruled Hodges insofar as it was incon-
sistent with the interpretation announced in Jones v. Mayer. 392 U.S. at 442-43.
The Court also had previously adopted a narrow interpretation of the thirteenth
amendment, thereby rendering it inadequate as the constitutional support for the statute.
Corrigan v. Bucldey, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,
16-18 (1906). In Jones v. Mayer, however, the Court drew upon an even earlier case
and quoted with emphasis a broader reading of the enabling clause of the thirteenth
amendment: "For that clause clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'"
392 U.S. at 439, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
173. 392 U.S. at 422.
174. Id. at 424-26.
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to include a prohibition of private discrimination.1'7 5 The Court also
examined the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1870176 upon the 1866
statute, concluding that the later act suggests no indication of a con-
gressional intent to modify the prohibition of all racial discrimination
with respect to the rights enumerated in section 1 of the 1866 Act.7 7
The present statutory guarantee against discrimination affecting prop-
erty rights is codified directly from section 1 of the 1866 statute, l' s
while the prohibition of discrimination concerning contractual rights is
codified from section 16 of the 1870 Act.'79 Since the later statute
reenacted the earlier,8 0 and in light of the Court's holding that the 1870
Act did not remove the bar against private discrimination contained in
section 1 of the 1866 Act,"8 ' the prohibitions in section 1 against dis-
crimination in contractual relations, now codified as section 1981 of
175. Id. at 422-36. The speeches upon which the Court relied in its interpretation of
the legislative history refer to all the fundamental rights guaranteed by the statute,
not merely the property rights which were at issue in the instant case. After examining
events contemporaneous to, and the legislative history of, the 1866 statute, the Court
concluded that the law requires a sufficiently broad reading to apply to incidents of
private racial discrimination: "In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt
it and the contents of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the Act
was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination,
whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein . . .
Id. at 436.
Several of the speeches discussed by the Court refer in part to the right to contract
guaranteed in the 1866 statute. Commenting upon the bill which became the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Representative 'Windom spoke directly to the connection between
the right to make contracts and the need to eliminate private instances of racial dis-
crimination in the labor area: "Its object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers
the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the payment of their
wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil." CoNm.
GLon, 39th Cong, Ist Sess. 1159 (1866).
176. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Star. 140.
177. 392 U.S. at 436-37.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by the white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and to no other.
180. Act of. May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
181. 392 U.S. at 436-37.
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Tide 42 of the United States Code, are available as a powerful weapon
for remedying racial discrimination in private employment.
Although the Court found that the 1870 statute does not detract from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a crucial issue with respect to relief under
the earlier law concerns the effect upon it of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.182 In examining the two nineteenth century statutes,
the Court emphasized 8" the policy against implied repeal of legislation,"'8
a policy which supports the contention that Title VII supplements,
rather than replaces, the 1866 statute. The debates preceding the pas-
sage of the 1964 Act demonstrate that the exclusions from its coverage
of certain groups of persons represented an attempt to minimize ad-
ministrative costs and difficulties,8 5 rather than to curtail protection
under existing laws. Moreover, acting before the Court's resurrection
of the 1866 law in Jones v. Mayer, Congress was concerned about
maintaining a demonstrable tie between the coverage of Title VII and
182. For a general discussion of the relationship between Tide VII and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, see Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 615, 621-37 (1969).
183. 392 U.S. at 437.
184. An excellent statement of this policy is as follows:
The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where
there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both
if possible. There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication
-(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a
repeal of the act. But, in either case, the intention of, the legislature to
repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing,
the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for,
the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same,
from the time of the first enactment.
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). The first sentence of the
passage was quoted by the Court in Jones v. Mayer. 392 U.S. at 437.
Other courts which have examined the relationship of Title VII and the 1866 Act
have recognized their supplemental nature, rejecting the suggestion that the later statute
repealed the earlier. See, e.g., Macldin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Young
v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wiscon-
sin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970).
185. For a summary and discussion of the administrative factors involved in the
limitation of Title VII coverage, see Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 615, 622-30 (1969).
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interstate commerce, the constitutional foundation of the 1964 legis-
lation.186 The reasons for the limitations in Title VII coverage thus
fail to present a clear and manifest congressional intention to repeal or
limit the coverage afforded under the 1866 statute. As a result, Title
VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantee coordinated relief, the
earlier law providing a remedy for those persons precluded from Title
VII relief.187
Application of Section 1981 to Private Employment
The Court in Jones v. Mayer interpreted section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 broadly, thereby providing an impetus to application of the
comprehensive protection of the section to discrimination in employ-
ment. Dobbins v. Local 212, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers'"8 marked the first application of the 1866 statute in the area
of labor relations. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that the statute prohibited racial discrimination
by a labor union, stating that "[m]embership in and/or a referral
status in a union is a contractual relationship and/or a link in the
chain of making a contract." 189 During the two years following Jones
v. Afayer, a split developed among the district courts with respect to
the availability of the 1866 law as a remedy for private racial discrim-
ination in employment, some aligning with the conclusion in Dobbins,9 '
others resisting the extension of section 1981 to private discriminatory
labor practices.' 9' Since 1970, however, the federal courts of appeals
consistendy have applied the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prohibit
private acts of discrimination in employment.
In I Vaters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co.,192
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 1981 "is
186. Id. at 624-30.
187. For a discussion of the exemptions from the class of persons covered by Title
VII, see note 109 supra. The time limitations for initiating administrative and judicial
relief under Title VII also preclude individuals failing to meet those requirements
from relief under the 1964 Act. See notes 114-16 supra & accompanying text.
188. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
189. Id. at 442.
190. Washington v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Clark
v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (ED. La. 1969).
191. Evans v. Local 2127, IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354 (ND. Ga. 1969); Waters v. Wis-
consin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 301 F. Supp. 663 (ND. 111. 1969), rev'd,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Smith v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (ND. Okla. 1970).
192. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
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intended to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment by
companies and unions," 193 basing its decision upon the common deriva-
tion of sections 1981 and 1982. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit confronted the identical issue in Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Ine.19 4 and adhered to the reasoning of Waters. Within a few months
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aligned itself with these
circuits in Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co.19 These
three decisions established a trend among the circuits which has con-
tinued in recent cases, 196 each recognizing section 1981 as a comprehen-
sive prohibition of racially discriminatory employment practices in the
private sector.
Section 1981 speaks generally of civil rights but does not detail the
remedies available. Congress has specifically provided, however, that a
party may proceed in federal district court "[t] o recover damages or to
secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing
for the protection of civil rights .... ,, 117 The propriety of injunctions
and damages, including back pay, has been recognized in section 1981
suits. 9 ' Several district courts have even included punitive damages
among the arsenal of section 1981 remedies.199
The breadth of section 1981 relief recommends the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 as a valuable means of redressing racial discrimination in em-
ployment. Moreover, these remedies are enhanced, as are those avail-
193. Id. at 482.
194. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
195. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
196. Hill v. American Airlines, Inc, 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spec-
tor Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cit. 1973); Payne v. Ford Motor Co.,
461 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1972); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1973); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971);
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
916 (1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1971).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) (1970).
198. See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1973); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Mizell v. North Broward Hospital Dist., 427 F.2d
468 (5th Cit. 1970); Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n,
375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
199. Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 343 F. Supp. 1350 (ND. Ill. 1972); Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (MD. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
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able under Title VII, by the permissibility of class actions20 0 and the
allowance of attorney's fees. 201 Because of the breadth of protection
provided by section 1981, it is necessary to examine its relationship
to other remedies.
Section 1981 and Other Remedies for Racial Discrimination
Clearly, section 1981 is a valuable complement to other statutory re-
lief, especially since it provides protection for those persons who are
excluded from Tide VII protection or who fail to comply with its time
limitations in seeking administrative and judicial relief.20 2  Although
courts, in examining the relationship of section 1981 and Tide VII, have
uniformly rejected the proposition that the latter impliedly repeals the
former,23 there is some disagreement concerning the availability of
immediate access to judicial remedies under section 1981 without prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies under Tide VII. Focusing upon
200. Class actions have been permitted under section 1981 in Macklin v. Spector
Freight Systems, Inc, 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1973); Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Cypress v. Newport
News General & Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967). As in
Title VII suits, class actions based on section 1981 are brought under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The argument that relief under Tide VII is in-
herently a class action is equally applicable to suits under the 1866 statute. See note 136
supra & accompanying text.
201. See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
202. Unlike Title VII, section 1981 lacks an explicit time limit within which an
action must be commenced; courts applying section 1981 to discrimination in employ-
ment have invoked the appropriate state statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Griffin v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc, 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Green v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 411
US. 792 (1973); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co, 438 F.2d 757 (3d
Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cit.
1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971); Vaters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co, 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). Moreover, it has been held that
the statute of limitations applicable to a section 1981 action is tolled when a complaint
is filed with the EEOC. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d
979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Contracting Co, 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1971); Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 F. Supp. 1373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
203. See cases cited in note 184 supra.
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the strong congressional emphasis in Title VII on conciliation, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that "a plaintiff must
exhaust his administrative remedies before the EEOC unless he provides
a reasonable excuse for his failure to do So." 205 The contrary position
was advanced in Young v. International Telephone , Telegraph Co.,2 6
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stating that the requirement
of an exhaustion of EEOC remedies prior to instituting suit under sec-
tion 1981 "would not be warranted by any language in Title VII." 207
On the premise that most cases under section 1981 would involve
equitable relief, the court reasoned that the policies of both statutes
could best be executed "[b]y fashioning equitable relief with due re-
gard to the availability of conciliation and by encouraging in appro-
priate cases a resort to the EEOC during the pendency of § 1981
cases." 208
In Caldwell v. National Brewing Co.,2°9 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit accepted the reasoning in Young and recommended that
the district courts adopt "the procedures set out in Young so as to
accord due regard to the conciliatory policy which is at the heart of
Title VII while at the same time preserving the full remedy of §
1981." 210 The procedures set forth in Young commend themselves as
means of achieving the shared goals of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 without subordinating the independent relief under section
1981. 211 Since it is well established that an actual attempt at conciliation
.by the EEOC is not a condition precedent to a suit under Title VII
itself,212 there appears little justification to hold resort to EEOC ad-
ministrative procedures a prerequisite to an action under the independent
remedy afforded by section 1981.
204. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 485-87
(7th Cir. 1970).
205. d. at 481.
206. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
207. Id. at 763.
208. Id. at 764.
209. 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971).
210. Id. at 1046.
211. When called upon to examine the question of exhaustion of EEOC remedies in
a section 1981 action, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ac-
cepted the reasoning of Young and Caldvell. Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc.,
479 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hill v.
American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973), reaffirmed the position it took
in Caldwell.
212. See cases cited in note 127 supra.
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A related issue concerns the relationship of section 1981 to the tradi-
tional labor process, specifically arbitration. The question of deferral to
arbitration in a suit under section 1981 is judicially unexplored terrain.
Since both the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964 are directed toward
the elimination of racial discrimination, however, an analogy to the
issue of deferral to arbitration in Title VII actions is appropriate. Again
at issue is the proper balance to be struck between the national labor
policy favoring arbitration 21 and the Title VII guarantee against dis-
crimination. Were the question of deferral to arbitration to arise in a
section 1981 action, the rule recently enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the Title VII context 214 might well control. As a result, although
there would be an opportunity through the traditional labor process
to settle a dispute out of court, an aggrieved employee would still be
accorded the right to obtain de novo judicial review on the section
1981 issue.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 has finally achieved recognition as a
valuable weapon in the statutory arsenal to combat racial discrimination
in employment. Its independent yet complementary relationship to
Title VII permits an employee to proceed under section 1981 where
the coverage and time limitations of the 1964 Act preclude relief there-
under. The equitable and legal relief under section 1981 is both
remedial and preventive and therefore must be viewed together with
the related statutory and traditional labor relations remedies, for it is
only through a comprehensive analysis of the remedies currently avail-
able that courts can properly assess the need for additional relief, and,
if such a need is apparent, determine which remedy can best serve to
meet the problem.
CONCLUSION
A primary purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to en-
sure the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. Rather than concerning
itself with the substance of grievances, Congress attempted to develop
a procedural framework within which the parties are encouraged to
reach a peaceful settlement of their differences through negotiation and
213. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
214. See notes 164-66 supra & accompanying text.
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compromise. In civil rights legislation, on the other hand, Congress
expressed an overriding concern for a particular result-the elimination
of employment discrimination. The difficulty with the Western Addi-
tion self-help approach to the resolution of charges of employment dis-
crimination lies in its attempt to achieve the goals of the outcome-
oriented civil rights legislation through a labor relations framework
which implicitly disclaims any attempt to bolster the position of either
party. It is submitted that, by permitting an employee to circumvent
the procedural constraints of the NLRA upon permissible self-help tac-
tics, the Western Addition approach unnecessarily jeopardizes the
Act's goal of promoting industrial peace. This conclusion is compelled
in light of existing remedies within the system of labor-management re-
lations and in particularized statutes for redressing discrimination in em-
ployment.
Although the doctrine of fair representation, grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures, and section 301 (a) actions all are currently of limited
utility, there are several basic, but easily implemented, improvements
which would facilitate an aggrieved employee's attempts to prevail
without the detrimental effects inherent in self-help. Shifting the burden
of proof on fair representation issues to the union, utilization of tri-
partite arbitration, and increased minority representation among union
leadership could eliminate many of the substantial barriers to the elimi-
nation of employment discrimination within the framework of labor
relations law.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a coordinated pro-
gram of administrative and judicial remedies to redress private acts
of racial discrimination in employment. Paralleling the national policy
favoring arbitration, EEOC conciliation efforts seek to remedy incidents
of alleged discrimination without unnecessarily involving the federal
courts. If these efforts prove inadequate, however, Title VII presents
a full range of judicial relief to remedy past as well as future discrimina-
tion. As a complement to the 1964 measure, the revitalized Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provides comprehensive judicial relief for those persons who
are excluded from Title VII coverage or who fail to satisfy the time
requirements for filing actions under that statute. These two measures,
taken together, provide an integrated program of administrative and
judicial relief with which to redress racial discrimination in employment.
By interpreting the provisions of both statutes broadly, the courts have
established their utility for the present and potential for the future.
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In contrast, the remedy of self-help proposed in Western Addition does
not provide a viable tool for use in redressing racially discriminatory
employment practices. It is submitted that, in light of available alterna-
tives, the instability which self-help injects into the labor arena far out-
weighs its advantages in combating racial discrimination.
